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ARBITRATION
Adams v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 888 F.2d 696
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiffs, Baker, Moore, L.A. Adams, andJohnnie Mae Adams ("In-
vestors"), appealed three separate orders of the district court. These
court orders compelled arbitration of claims arising under the Securities
Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Oklahoma securities
laws, common law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty; breach of contract,
and negligent management. The Investors contended that: (1) Investor
Moore could not be compelled to arbitrate because she did not sign a
customer agreement with defendant Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner &
Smith ("Merrill Lynch"); (2) the agreements to arbitrate could not be
enforced because they are contracts of adhesion; (3) the arbitration
agreements were procured through fraud; (4) Merrill Lynch waived its
right to arbitration; and (5) the district court erred in granting Merrill
Lynch's FED. R. Civ. P. 60 (B)(6) motion, which asked the court to recon-
sider its refusal to compel arbitration of daims arising under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's decision. The court
held that the district court's finding that all the Investors had executed
customer agreements with Merrill Lynch was not dearly erroneous. The
court stated that the agreements to arbitrate were not contracts of adhe-
sion, neither were the agreements procured by fraud. The agreements
clearly and unambiguously set forth the arbitration provisions. More-
over, the law presumes that one has read that which he has signed. The
court further held that Merrill Lynch did not waive its right to arbitra-
tion when it attempted to resolve the dispute prior to suit. Also, Merrill
Lynch's failure to demand arbitration prior to suit did not waive its right
to arbitration. A party opposing a motion to compel arbitration must
show it has been substantially prejudiced by the delay; the Investors in
this case failed to meet that burden. The court then found that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in granting Merrill Lynch's FED.
R. Civ. P. 60 (B) (6) motion. The court reasoned that a change in relevant
case law by the United States Supreme court warranted relief under the
rule.

